AITAT

AITAT INFORMATION NOTE ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE URDA ACCIDENT: INFORMATION AVAILABLE 24 HOURS AFTER THE OCCURRENCE

This report summarises the information available to the Independent Administrative Authority for the Technical Investigation of Railway, Maritime and Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents (AITAT) regarding the accident that occurred on 28th October 2026 in Urda (province of Toledo), and the actions taken by the Authority within the first 24 hours following the incident.

Accident data

On Wednesday 28th October, at 8:53 am, a rear-end collision occurred between two trains at kilometre marker 118+800, on track 2 of the 010 Madrid–Seville high-speed line, at the entrance to Urda station (province of Toledo). The trains involved were, firstly, the Iryo 6076 Madrid–Seville train (Hitachi ETR1000 109.015), consisting of eight carriages and carrying 147 passengers and 5 crew members; secondly, the other train involved was the Renfe AVE 2080 Madrid–Seville (Siemens 103.006 variant), consisting of eight carriages and carrying 379 passengers and 7 crew members on board.

The Iryo train was stopped at the signal E242 (entry signal) in Urda station, when it was struck from behind by the AVE train. The collision occurred at an estimated speed of between 160 and 200 km/h, although the exact speed will not be known until the data has been extracted from the on-board event recorder. The collision caused the leading carriage of the AVE train (carriage #8 according to the train's numbering) to become embedded in the rear carriage of the Iryo train (carriage #1 according to the train's numbering), with both ending up overturned and twisted at the foot of the track embankment. The rest of the AVE train derailed completely, with the last six carriages (in the direction of travel, numbers #1 to #6) remaining on the track, whilst carriage #7 fell down the embankment. Carriage #3 (the third from last in the direction of travel) was also pierced by a section of track rail that had been deformed as a result of the collision. As for the Iryo train, apart from what has been mentioned regarding its rear carriage, all its carriages derailed except for the first two (#7 and #8), with the rear carriage (#1), the penultimate carriage and the antepenultimate carriage (#2 and #3) falling down the embankment.

The accident resulted in numerous fatalities and serious injuries: at the time of writing, the death toll stands at 69, with over 200 people injured to varying degrees; however, these figures are not final and are likely to be revised at a later date.

There has also been significant damage to the infrastructure, resulting in the suspension of services on the line, with no forecast, as yet, as to when it will reopen.

Due to its severity, this accident falls into the category of a serious accident, which requires the AITAT to launch a mandatory and immediate technical investigation, in accordance with Law 2/2024 of 1st August.

Actions taken by the AITAT

The AITAT's Directorate for Technical Investigation of Railway Accidents and Incidents was notified of the incident at 9:10 am on the same day. A team comprising three technical investigators was mobilised; they left their offices in Madrid at around 10:20 am and arrived at the scene of the accident at around 12:15 pm. The team inspected the point where the collision occurred, the infrastructure at that point, the vehicles involved in the accident and the damage caused, taking photographs and gathering initial information from those present. The team subsequently travelled to the Local Operations Post in Urda to inspect and collect the event logs from the signalling system. At all times, the team worked in coordination with the security and emergency services present at the scene, as well as with the railway undertakings involved and the infrastructure manager.

At the same time, a second team (comprising the director of technical investigation of rail accidents and a councillor on the rail sector from the AITAT) travelled to Adif high-speed Regulation and Control Centre (CRC), located at Atocha station in Madrid. There, they inspected the control room of the traffic controller (RC) in charge of the section where the accident occurred, reviewed the call log, viewed the video recordings and listened to the recordings of communications in the moments leading up to the collision, gathering information from the Adif staff present and taking copies of all the aforementioned items. At the time of writing, the key individuals involved (train drivers and traffic controllers) have not yet been interviewed, as they are not in a fit state to do so.

The team of three investigators on site at Urda left shortly after 9:00 pm, returning the following day (Thursday 29th) at around 8:00 am, assisted by two additional investigators from the AITAT. Throughout Thursday, they continued their inspection of the scene of the incident, paying particular attention to the condition of the trains involved and their safety systems.

Furthermore, the team of investigators has worked alongside the judicial police and the railway companies to retrieve the on-board data recorders from the trains, although in some cases the condition of the rolling stock has made it

difficult to access these devices. The data recorders (both the legal recorders and other auxiliary devices) have been placed in the custody of the Civil Guard (in its capacity as the judicial police in charge). The data from the recorders will be downloaded in the next days, in accordance with the conditions set by the Court of First Instance of Orgaz (Courtroom No. 2 of the Civil and Preliminary Investigation Section), which has taken charge of the preliminary investigation into this accident.

The investigation team's fieldwork is expected to continue for at least one more day.

Information gathered and next steps

The subsequent investigation must analyse the causes and circumstances that led to the accident. These issues must be analysed in depth, whilst also examining possible environmental, organisational and procedural factors that might have mitigated or exacerbated any potential failures. The LZB malfunctions that led to the hazardous situation resulting in the accident will also be analysed.

In any case, the AITAT is currently in the phase of gathering information on site and compiling documentation and data from the various records. In the subsequent phases of the investigation, further actions will be carried out as necessary (such as interviews, inspections of other facilities or rolling stock, and a review of the maintenance of the facilities, etc.). **At present, as the investigation is at an early stage, all hypotheses regarding the possible causes and factors that may have contributed to the incident remain open, and no explanations can be put forward beyond the verified data. The findings of the investigation will be set out, in due course, in the final report.**

In accordance with the regulations, the AITAT generally has a period of one year in which to publish the final investigation report. The AITAT has published the investigation initiation form on its website, containing the basic details of the incident and a contact form so that those affected and parties with an interest in this incident can be kept informed of the progress of the investigation.

Acknowledgements and condolences

The AITAT wishes to thank the other organisations present at the scene of the incident for their cooperation. The investigators on the ground have been able to carry out all the necessary work for the technical investigation without hindrance and without their authority and independence being compromised.

The work and cooperation of the emergency services, the fire service, Civil Protection, the Military Emergency Unit (UME), the Civil Guard, the Civil Guard's forensic service, ADIF-AV, Renfe, Iryo, Nertus and Hitachi have been crucial in ensuring that the collection of evidence was carried out as quickly as possible and with the utmost rigour. The AITAT expresses its gratitude to the staff of all these organisations.

Finally, the AITAT extends its condolences to the victims of this tragic incident and to their loved ones and stands ready to assist them in accordance with the terms set out in its regulations.

WARNING:

- **The information presented in this note does not constitute definitive conclusions about this accident.**
- **During the investigation process, new findings that modify the hypotheses presented may emerge.**
- **The only valid conclusions will be those included in the final report.**
- **Investigations carried out by the AITAT are regulated by Law 2/2024 and Royal Decree 623/2014.**
- **Technical investigations carried out by the AITAT have, according to EU and national legislation, the sole objective of contributing to the improvement of safety, preventing future accidents or mitigating their consequences.**
- **In accordance with EU and national legislation, the AITAT will in no case seek to determine blame or responsibility for the events it investigates.**

Madrid, 29th October 2026